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This paper analyses banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights within the framework 
of a simple, integrated assessment model.  Breaking the world economy in just two regions it 
will be shown:  (1) Increasing when-flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement through banking 
and borrowing of carbon emission permits has a positive effect on welfare for regions with a 
poor endowment in carbon emission rights, but negatively affects rich-endowed regions.  (2) 
Intergenerational  fairness  advocates  intertemporal  flexibility  in  greenhouse  gas  abatement, 
irrespectively of the initial allocation of carbon rights.  (3) Optimal carbon accumulation is 
not independent of the initial allocation of carbon rights.  Different initial sharing rules clearly 
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1  Introduction  
There are different ways to look at the global climate problem.  One is to identify efficient 
abatement strategies through cost-benefit considerations.  Another is to relate the global cli-
mate problem to ideas of intergenerational fairness and equity.  This paper links both aspects 
to the issue of flexibility in when to abate greenhouse gas emissions.  When flexibility in 
greenhouse gas abatement is established through banking and borrowing of carbon emission 
rights.  With banking, emission rights can be saved for future use; with borrowing present 
emissions might be extended against future abatement.  This should reduce costs simply by 
transferring abatement activities over time.  But does it enforce regional welfare?, and does it 
increase intergenerational equity?  Addressing these questions is the issue of this paper. 
When flexibility is not a novel institution.  It is nothing else than a specific kind of permit 
trade in which individuals, firms or even nations sell to or buy from themselves.  Nonetheless 
there are some important differences between international trade of carbon rights on the one 
hand and when flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement on the other.  First, global climate 
change is a stock damage problem.  If nations are allowed to shift emissions over time, this 
could affect the dynamics of climate change, the marginal costs of damages and – equally 
important - the marginal productivity of capital.  Second, efficiency in greenhouse gas abate-
ment requires equal marginal costs of abatement across nations, - a requirement that is not 
granted without international trade in emission permits.  This motivates to have a closer look 
on the issues of equity and efficiency if when to abate flexibility prevails.   
Unfortunately, the economic literature is not very helpful on this issue.  On the one hand, 
theoretical analyses are rather ambiguous.  For example, Biglaiser et al. (1995) conclude that 
intertemporal permit trade must not be efficient.  Kling and Rubin (1997) argue that although 
banking and borrowing do not assure Pareto-efficiency, banning when flexibility is also not 
optimal.  And recently, Leiby and Rubin (2001) have shown that in the case of starting from a 
non-optimal emission path intertemporal permit trade could improve welfare.  On the other 
hand, although where flexibility is a feature of almost any integrated assessment model, bank-
ing and borrowing is typically not included.  Exceptions are among others the papers by 
Manne and Richels (1995), Kosobud et al. (1994) and Westskog (2000).  However, these 
studies do not focus on Pareto-efficient abatement strategies, nor do they analyze the interplay 
between equity, efficiency and when flexibility as is intended in this paper.  
This analysis abstracts from the issue of uncertainty.  And we are not interested in considering 
gaming or threat situations.  Instead, we are interested in cooperative solutions, where one 
region cannot improve its welfare without a reduction in the welfare of another.  Given that 
the percentage shares of global emissions are determined exogenously, a multi-region com-
putable general equilibrium model is employed to answer the questions:  Does when flexibility 
in greenhouse gas abatement affect the atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases?  Will 
banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights improve regional welfare?  Does the initial 
allocation of carbon emissions rights matter? 
The rest is organized as follows:  Section 2 carries out a simple analytical analysis.  Section 3 
presents our version of an integrated assessment model.  Although highly stylized, essential 
features and numerical parameters are taken over from the MERGE (see Manne et al. 1995), 
the  ROR  (see  Manne  and  Stephan  1999)  and  the  MEDEA  framework  (see  Stephan  and 
Müller-Fürstenberger 1998).  Scenarios are discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 reports the ma-  2
jor findings, while sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is given in Section 6.  
Finally, Section 7 covers concluding remarks. 
2.  Preliminary considerations  
To fix ideas, consider a simple analytical example.  Suppose R regions cooperate in the solu-
tion of the global climate problem over a time horizon of two periods.  Global climate change 
is viewed as public bad and is driven by the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions.  Re-
gional welfare Wr, r = 1,...,R, solely depends on the consumption cr(t) of the private good dur-
ing periods t = 1, 2.  That means, emissions do not enter directly into the utility function.  In-
stead they directly affect regional production. 
To sidestep a detailed energy-production model conventional output yr(t) of region r is viewed 
as a function of its greenhouse gas emissions sr(t) 
yr(t)   =   Fr(sr(t)),  
where the production function Fr has the conventional properties.  Now, let wr be the Negishi-
weights associated to region r.  Then a Pareto-efficient allocation must maximize the objec-
tive function (see Ginsburgh and Keyzer 1977) 
  ￿rwrWr[cr(1),cr(2)] 
subject to the constraints 
(2.1)    ￿rFr(sr(1)) - ￿rcr(1)   =   0, 
(2.2)    ￿rFr(Q)Fr(sr(t)) - ￿rcr(2)   =   0, 
(2.3)    Q - ￿rsr(1) - ￿rsr(2)   =   0. 
Equation (2.1) requires that in period 1 the world’s total output covers the sum of consump-
tion across regions.  (2.2) establishes a similar balance for produced goods in period 2, but 
takes into account that climate change negatively affects conventional production.  Fr is the 
region-specific damage factor and measures the fraction of conventional gross output that is at 
a region’s disposal.  That means, the higher the stock of accumulated global emissions Q, the 
lower is Fr(Q) and the lower will be the fraction, ￿rFr(Q)Fr(sr(t)), of conventional wealth that 
is available for consumption in period 2. 
Let p1, p2 and p be the Lagrange-multipliers that are associated to equations (2.1), (2.2) and 
(2.3), respectively.  Then, first order conditions immediately imply almost conventional opti-
mality conditions for any region r: 
(2.4)    p1/p2      =   [¶Wr/¶cr(1)]/[¶Wr/¶cr(2)], 
(2.5)    p1/p2      =   -[￿j=1,...,R F¢j(Q)Fj(sj(2))]/F¢r(sr(1)), 
(2.6)    Fr(Q)F¢r(sr(2))   =   -[￿j=1,...,R F¢j(Q)Fj(sj(2))]. 
Equation (2.4) is a well known Ramsey-condition.  (2.5) establishes optimality in the presence 
of a public bad.  To see this combine (2.4) and (2.5) 
(2.5a)    [¶Wr/¶cr(1)]F¢r(sr(1))   =   -[￿j=1,...,R F¢j(Q)Fj(sj(2))] [¶Wr/¶cr(2)]   3
and suppose that region r - ceteris paribus - reduces abatement by one unit in period 1.  This 
increases consumption, hence regional welfare, as the left hand side of (2.5a) indicates.  And 
it increases atmospheric carbon, hence imposes climate change induced costs on each region.  
For Pareto-efficiency it is necessary, however, to internalize these external effects as the right 
hand side of (2.5a) expresses. 
What can be learned from the specific public bad model adopted here?  First, for Pareto-
efficiency marginal cost of abatement has to be identical across regions as (2.5) and (2.6) to-
gether indicate.  Second, the right hand side of (2.5) corresponds to the slope of the intertem-
poral transformation frontier.  The later is independent of the initial allocation of regional 
emission shares as well as the Negishi-weights.  However, since Negishi-weights are propor-
tional to the present value of the respective region’s wealth (see Manne and Olsen 1996), this 
suggests separability between efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement and the initial distribu-
tion of convention wealth.
 1 
This could have far reaching policy implications.  If the Pareto-efficient stock of atmospheric 
carbon is independent of the initial allocation of conventional resources, a sharp distinction 
might be drawn between determining the global level of abatement and negotiating the cost 
sharing rules.  Equity would be an issue of allocating shares of the global total to the individ-
ual nations through international negotiations.  Efficiency could be achieved through trading 
these rights internationally without major changes in the historical ownership of labor, capital 
and other conventional resources (see Manne 1999).  This is in sharp contrast to Chichilnisky 
and Heal (1994) who insist that the global climate problem cannot be solved without interna-
tional wealth transfers.  In particular they showed that international trade in carbon negatively 
affects the poorer countries.  However, their argument hinges on the fact that global climate 
change directly affects utilities.  This means that the public good enters into the objective 
function, - an issue that is neglected in the present paper.
2 
So far our considerations have been based upon the assumption that there is full flexibility in 
greenhouse gas abatement, both in terms when and where flexibility.  But what, if emission 
rights are assigned to the individual regions, but not allowed to be traded internationally?  
There are two observations that will be important for the rest of this paper.  First, regions do-
mestically have to abate a certain fraction of their carbon emissions.  Or, to put it differently, 
regions are allowed to produce a certain, exogenously determined fraction mr of the atmos-
pheric carbon stock Q.  Therefore condition (2.3) has to be replaced by 
(2.3a)    mrQ - sr(1) - sr(2)   =   0 
which has to be obeyed by each region r.  Solving again for optimality gives 
(2.5a)    p1/p2   =   -[￿r =1,...,RFr(Q)F¢r(sr(2))]/[￿r=1,...,R mrF¢r(sr(1))], 
(2.6a)    ￿r =1,...,RmrFr(Q)F¢r(sr(2))   =   -[￿r=1,...,R F¢r(Q)Fr(sr(2))].  
Now emission shares, mr, are part of the optimality conditions and marginal cost of abatement 
is not equalized between regions.  This implies that the optimal stock of atmospheric carbon 
                                                 
1 For any pair of regions, r, k, first order conditions imply: wr > wk if and only if ¶Uk/¶ck > ¶Ur/¶cr. Given strictly 
quasi-concave utility functions, region r is wealthier in terms of conventional consumption than region k. 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee who made us aware of this difference.   4
depends on the allocation of emission shares.  In other words, the issues of equity cannot be 
separated from that of efficiency.  
Second, banking only - and the same holds true in the case of borrowing only – turns out be-
ing a Pareto-inferior flexibility regime.  To see that recall that for any pair of regions i, j, con-
ditions (2.5) and (2.6) for optimality together imply 
(2.7)    Fi(Q)F¢i(si(2)) / F¢i(si(1))    =   Fj(Q)F¢j(sj(2)) / F¢j(sj(1)). 
Now, suppose region i reduces emissions by one unit in period 1 to extend emissions in pe-
riod 2.  Since the production functions Fr have the usual properties, transferring emissions into 
the future reduces the numerator and increases the denominator, hence the left hand side quo-
tient of condition (2.7).  To fulfill the necessary requirement (2.7) for Pareto-efficiency, all 
other regions have to act in the same way.  That means, regions simultaneously either bank or 
borrow carbon emission rights.   
The consequences of that observation are almost obvious.  If regions exploit intertemporal 
flexibility through banking, given the naive one-to-one banking rule, this does not change the 
atmospheric stock of carbon (see (2.3)).  But reduces first period consumption and increases 
consumption in the second period (recall (2.1) and (2.2)).  Hence, if utilities are discounted at 
positive rates, banking can turn out to be Pareto-inefficient. 
 
3.  Regional MEDEA 
Of course, numerical simulations are not a perfect substitute for analytical considerations.  
However, since the interplay  between banking  and borrowing, Pareto-efficiency in  green-
house gas abatement, burden sharing and equity are highly complex, numerical thought ex-
periments  will  provide  additional  insight.    Having  this  in  mind,  the  general  equilibrium 
framework with public  good is deliberately simple.  There are two regions of the world:  
North (N) and South (S).  North consists of the OECD countries including the former Soviet 
Union.  Roughly this corresponds to the so-called ANNEX I parties.  South covers the rest of 
the world and should be viewed as an acronym for the developing part of the world. 
Time is discrete and periods are one decade in length.  Each region produces a homogenous 
output that may be used for consumption, investment, net exports and to cover energy costs.  
Carbon-free energy resources such as hydro or solar are viewed as backstop resources.  They are 
provided at constant, but high marginal costs.  Greenhouse resources such as oil, gas and coal are 
supplied at initially lower but increasing costs. 
Among the various greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is considered as the most relevant one.  We 
neglect the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating effects of greenhouse gases other than 
carbon dioxide.  We neglect the thermal inertia lag between global concentrations and climate 
change.  And we neglect climate externalities that are not valued in a market.  Instead, global 
warming is directly attributed to cumulative CO2 emissions and affects production of different 
regions of the world in different ways (for a discussion, see Joos et al. 1999).  
3.1  Climate-economy interaction 
There are two channels through which the environment and the economy interact.  One is the 
consumption of greenhouse resources, which directly determines the flow of CO2 emissions into   5
the global atmosphere.  The second link is provided through the concept of the green output by 
which global climate change is translated into economic costs.  
A two-box model is used to cumulate carbon emissions over time, and to translate them into 
global concentrations.  (For a detailed discussion of functional specifications and choice of 
parameters, see Joos et al. 1999.)  At any point of time the stock of atmospheric carbon diox-
ide, Q(t), is a function of the former one, Q(t-1), and global past period emissions, s(t-1): 
(3.1)    Q(t) = YQ(t-1) + Qs(t-1). 
Y is the factor by which natural abatement reduces the current stock of atmospheric carbon.  
Q is the fraction of past global emissions that has accumulated in the atmosphere.  
Climate impact analyses usually focus on doubling atmospheric carbon.  This is scanty, but 
sufficient information to calibrate a damage function.  However, it does not tell how to spec-
ify such a functional relationship appropriately.  In our model economic losses are a function 
of the square of the stock of atmospheric carbon Q(t) and are inversely proportional to a re-
gion specific catastrophe level Wr.  At this atmospheric CO2 perturbation, production in region r 
= N(orth), S(outh) is reduced to zero: 
(3.2)    Fr(Q(t)) = 1 - [Q(t) / Wr]
2.  
Note that contrary to a linear one, this specification gives rise to high marginal damages in the 
future but low ones in the present (for a discussion, see Peck and Teisberg 1992).  For cali-
brating economic losses it is assumed that with zero abatement concentrations will rise from 
353 ppm (the 1990 level) to 560 ppm (twice the pre-industrial level) by about 2070.  This 
leads to damages of 3.5% of gross output in the South and 1.5% of GDP in the North.  
3.2  Production, emissions and abatement 
Principally, there are two ways to reduce CO2 emissions.  One is to replace greenhouse fuels by 
carbon-free energy inputs.  A second option is to uncouple economic growth from fossil fuel 
consumption by increasing the energy efficiency and by substituting capital for energy.  To cap-
ture both possibilities, the regional production possibilities are represented through nested con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions
3:  






Capital kr(t), labor lr(t) and energy inputs er(t) together produce the conventional (i.e. without 
climate effects) output, yr(t).  b1 and b2 are CES-coefficients derived from base year data, and 
e is the CES elasticity of substitution between capital/labor and energy. 
Substitution between capital and labor is described by a Cobb-Douglas formulation where a 
is the corresponding parameter.  Total energy inputs into regional production,  
(3.4)    er(t) = fr(t) + nr(t),  
are the sum of flows of fossil fuels fr(t) and of backstop energy resources nr(t).  
3.3  Material balance of produced goods 
                                                 
3 For better readability regional indices on parameters are omitted.  For more details on the specification of func-
tional forms, see Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (1998).   6
Climate change negatively affects the productivity of the regional economies.  Only the fraction 
Fr(Q(t)) of conventional gross output yr(t) is still at their disposal (see Section 2).  Within each 
region r, green output, Fr(Q(t))yr(t), can be consumed, invested into conventional capital forma-
tion, or used to supply either greenhouse resources or carbon-free energy. 
Energy supply costs are measured in units of gross production.  Marginal costs br of carbon-free 
energy are constant, but approximately four times as high as costs of greenhouse resources in the 
initial year.  Marginal costs ar(t) of greenhouse resources increase over time, depending upon the 
cumulated extraction in prior periods. 
To prevent an excessively rapid rate of market penetration once renewable resources become 
competitive,  it  is  assumed  that  after  an  energy  supply  system  is  installed,  it  is  quasi-
irreversible and cannot be abandoned immediately.  Accordingly, the replacement rate is lim-
ited to 20% annually
4:  
(3.5)    fr(t+1) ³ 0.8fr(t). 
With this formulation there is the possibility that market prices of energy temporarily over-
shoot the marginal costs of the renewable resources.  
Regional output is considered as numeraire that can be traded internationally.  Therefore, if xr(t) 
denotes net-exports, cr(t) consumption, and ir(t) investment in conventional capital, then for each 
period t 
(3.6)    Fr(Q(t))yr(t) ³ cr(t) + ir(t) + xr(t) + ar(t)fr(t)+ brnr(t) 
is the material balance of commodities produced and traded in region r.  Finally, since net-
imports have to balance out in each period t, condition 
(3.7)    xN(t) + xS(t) = 0 
has to be obeyed globally. 
3.4  Intertemporal decisions 
At any point of time t, the regional endowment kr(t) in physical capital depends upon investment 
activities, ir(t-1), and the former capital stock, kr(t-1) 
(3.8)    kr(t) = (1-ur)kr(t-1) + ir(t-1),  
where  ur is the regional capital depreciation rate. 
At first glance, the natural approach to the economics of global climate change would be to em-
ploy an overlapping generations model.  It was shown, however, that under reasonable assump-
tions both an infinitely lived agent framework and an overlapping generations model would iden-
tify the same greenhouse policies as being efficient (see Stephan et al. 1997).  Therefore, with-
out loss of generality it is supposed that for striking an optimal balance between consumption, 
physical investment and greenhouse gas abatement regions follow a Ramsey path. 
                                                 
4 A phase-out constraint as applied here mimics sunk-costs in the energy sector. Alternatively, inertia within the 
energy system can be reflected through adjustment costs or limits on the speed of adopting new technologies.     7
Let d be the social discount rate, then consumption, production, investment into physical capital 
and greenhouse gas abatement are determined in each region r = N, S, as if a policy maker has 
maximized the discounted sum of the logarithm of consumption, cr(t) 
(3.9)    Wr = St d
-t ln(cr(t)). 
If there were no capital mobility and no investment into greenhouse gas abatement, both re-
gions would develop independently.  But if the regions agree to cooperate on greenhouse 
abatement, prices, supplies and demands are generated through a multi-region multi-period 
general equilibrium model.  Solutions are obtained via Rutherford’s sequential joint maximi-
zation method - a specialization of the Negishi approach (see Rutherford 1999).  
 
4.  Scenarios 
Several scenarios can be created simply by combining different degrees of when and/or where 
to abate flexibility with different rules of how to allocate of carbon emission shares to the 
individual regions. 
We consider three initial assignments of carbon rights (see Figure 4.1).  GRAND represents 
the so-called grand-fathering rule.  That is, shares are attributed to regions according to their 
fraction of the world’s total emissions in the benchmark year (1990).  CAP nicknames the 
assumption that shares smoothly move from GRAND values to an equal-man-equal-rights 
distribution.  More precisely, in CAP the endowment of the North declines from 45% of the 
world’s total in 2000 to a 10% share in 2050.  Finally, OPTIMA is a particular distribution 
rule.  Emission shares are determined such that marginal abatement costs are equal across 
regions.  That is, OPTIMA assures Pareto-efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement from the 
scratch without the necessity of trading, banking or borrowing carbon emission rights. 





























There are also three different flexibility regimes.  FLEX allows for trading carbon rights on 
open international markets.  BABO refers to banking and borrowing of carbon emissions, and 
the acronym NOF indicates that both options for creating flexibility are excluded. 
Table 4.1 identifies six scenarios that differ with respect to how flexibility in greenhouse gas 
abatement and the initial endowment in emission shares are combined.  The labeling of the 
different scenarios is self-explaining.  For example, GRAND-BABO indicates that banking 
and borrowing of carbon emission rights is feasible, while emission shares initially were allo-
cated according to the grand-fathering rule.  
 
 







GRAND-NOF  No   No   Yes  No 
CAP-NOF  No   No   No   Yes 
GRAND-FLEX  No   Yes   Yes   No 
CAP-FLEX  No   Yes   No   Yes 
GRAND-BABO  Yes   No   Yes   No 
CAP-BABO  Yes   No   No   Yes 
 
Table 4.1: Scenarios 
 
The listing of scenarios in Table 4.1 needs two additional qualifications.  First, the interested 
reader may recognize that a scenario seems missing that allows both for when and where 
flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement.  Note, however, that – independent of the initial dis-
tribution of emission shares - trade in carbon permits will end up exactly at the regional dis-
tribution of emissions that emerges from OPTIMA.  As such OPTIMA corresponds to a sce-
nario with full flexibility, both in and over time.  And it assures Pareto-efficiency by defini-
tion.  This is a reason why we do not list the where-and-when flexibility scenario separately. 
Second, scenarios where regions can save carbon permits but are not allowed to borrow per-
mits are not considered here.  As has been argued in Section 2 pure banking and pure borrow-
ing policies will turn out being Pareto-inefficient.  Since we focus the attention to Pareto-
efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement, these scenarios are not considered in the following. 
Before presenting results, let us consider how the different flexibility scenarios are imple-
mented into our integrated assessment model.  Suppose mr(t) denotes the share of carbon 
emission rights that is attributed exogenously to region r.  Under NOF assumptions regions 
are authorized to consume only their own endowment.  Hence, each region r has to obey 
(4.1)    mr(t)s(t) – sr(t) ³ 0,   9
where s(t) is the optimal global CO2 emission target for period t.  Since optimal emission tar-
gets are determined endogenously, they might vary from scenario to scenario. 
International trade of carbon rights implies that the marginal cost of abatement is identical 
across regions (see Section 2).  Consequently, compared to NOF regions should gain from 
implementing where to abate flexibility.  Now, even if emission permits can freely be trans-
ferred between regions, both in GRAND-FLEX and CAP-FLEX the condition 
(4.2)    [s(t) - sN(t) - sS(t)] ³ 0 
has to be fulfilled from period to period.
5  And since each region can generate additional in-
come by selling carbon emission rights, it must be assured that it stays on its intertemporal 
budget constraint.  This means, net-imports have to be financed through counter trade of car-
bon rights and vice versa. 
With BABO regional economies may save and borrow carbon emission permits, but they are 
not allowed to trade them on open markets.  Since we assume that carbon permits are speci-
fied non-discriminatory with respect to their date of execution, there is no re- or devaluation 
in terms of physical carbon units over time.  Hence, each region r has to obey 
(4.3)    ￿t[mr(t)s(t) - sr(t)] = 0. 
At first glance it is expected that because of increased flexibility, banking and borrowing of 
carbon emission rights should reduce costs and positively affect welfare.  However, there 
could be two countervailing effects.  For an illustration, assume emission shares are allocated 
according to CAP.  Abatement costs are borne early and benefits do not accrue until the dis-
tant future.  Therefore, North has an incentive to borrow carbon emission rights.  This might 
lead to what environmentalists fear - higher atmospheric carbon concentrations, hence higher 
ecological damages and - as a consequence - welfare losses. 
Moreover, as the global climate is a public good, South is affected by the North's borrowing 
decision.  For an optimal solution these effects have to be internalized.  I.e., the South has to 
compensate  the  delay  in  greenhouse  gas  abatement  by  the  North  through  increasing  his 
abatement activities in the near-distant future.  Again this can imply welfare losses, now for 
the southern economies. 
Finally recognize that the rate of interest on carbon permits – which may be called the bio-
logical rate of interest – is endogenous in our modeling.  By reason of intertemporal effi-
ciency, it is equal to the rate of interest on physical capital.   
 
5.  Numerical results 
5.1  Atmospheric carbon 
Does when to abate flexibility lead to what environmentalists fear - excessive borrowing of 
carbon emission permits at early periods?   
 
                                                 
5 s
r(t), r =N,S, denote the CO2 emissions of region r in period t.   10
 
The answer is neither no nor really yes (see Figure 5.1).  Increasing when flexibility forces 
higher atmospheric carbon concentration.  Depending upon the scenario, peak-levels vary 
from 660 ppm to 710 ppm.  This implies market damages between 3.9% and 4.9 % GDP in 
the North, while the South experiences GDP-losses in the order of 7.8% to 9.8%.  Of course, 
these are not dramatic differences, but nevertheless significant - in particular, since effects 
depend upon the initial distribution of carbon rights.  If emission shares are distributed ac-
cording  to  GRAND,  then  the  differences  in  peak-levels  between  no flexibility  (GRAND-
NOF) and when flexibility (GRAND-BABO) are higher than under CAP distribution (com-
pare CAP-NOF and CAP BABO).    In  any case however, peak-levels under GRAND are 
smaller than those with the CAP initial allocation of carbon emission rights (see Figure 5.1). 
Our simulations reveal that where flexibility yields exactly the same trajectory in atmospheric 
carbon as OPTIMA, irrespectively to the initial allocation of carbon rights.  This supports the 
hypothesis we have formulated in Section 2:  The optimal carbon stock is independent of the 
initial allocation emission shares if it were feasible to trade carbon rights on open interna-
tional markets.  But, if where flexibility is absent and when flexibility prevails only, separabil-
ity in that sense is not observed – again as expected in Section 2. 
Moreover, consistent with Copeland and Taylor (2001) who employ a trade-theory approach 
instead of a CGE-model, where flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement is associated with the 
highest carbon levels.  There are two explanations.  First, we do not include non-market dam-
ages.  External effects of climate change can be fully internalized by assigning carbon emis-
sions rights, and Pareto-efficiency is assured through trade.  Second, trade-induced economic 
growth outweighs the negative impact of higher climate damages.  That is, an efficient econ-
omy may provide higher green GDP by producing more conventional output as well as higher 
emissions. 





















5.2  Regional emissions 
When flexibility does not significantly affect the atmospheric accumulation of carbon, but the 
development of regional emissions changes notably as Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate.  
 
 
It is immediate from Figures 5.2 and 5.3 that a region’s decision either to bank or to borrow 
carbon permits depends upon its initial endowment of carbon rights.  If carbon shares are as-
signed according to GRAND, North uses the banking option to postpone emissions almost till 
the end of the century.  The South, in turn, heavily borrows carbon permits, in particular dur-







































ing the decades after 2030.  This indicates that under GRAND burning fossil fuels has a rela-
tively high marginal value to the South, whereas the North reacts by cutting back emissions.  
But if carbon shares are attributed according to the CAP-rule, borrowing is favorable to North 
and banking to the South (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).  The argument behind this observation is 
the same as in GRAND with reversed roles.  
Note that independent of how emission shares are attributed, international trade of carbon 
emission rights leads to the same regional emission as observed in OPTIMA.  And note that 
both under CAP and GRAND allocation rules when flexibility stipulates emissions to ap-
proach the OPTIMA path.  Indeed, till the middle of our century OPTIMA, CAP-BABO and 
GRAND-BABO coincide.  Moreover, the other region’s banking exactly offsets one region’s 
borrowing.  This explains why differences in atmospheric carbon are so small.  
5.3  Aggregated welfare  
How do the different flexibility regimes and initial distribution rules affect present values of 
regional welfare?  If expressed in percent deviations from OPTIMA values, welfare effects 









Figure 5.4: Utility North 
 
That the initial allocation of emission shares matters is unambiguous.  Independent of the de-
gree of flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement, North is best with GRAND (see Figure 5.4).  
Relative to OPTIMA the North gains both in the GRAND-FLEX and the GRAND-BABO 
scenario.  If emission shares are distributed according to the CAP rule, North looses welfare 
relative to OPTIMA in any of the flexibility scenarios.  As such, North’s best choice would be 






Figure 5.4: Utility North
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For the South the situation is just reversed (see Figure 5.5).  If the South had a choice, in any 
case he would vote for CAP. Compared to OPTIMA the South suffers welfare losses both in 
the GRAND-BABO and the GRAND-NOF scenario, whereas it can gain in overall welfare, if 
emission rights are distributed according to the CAP principle.  
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that introducing where to abate flexibility increases wel-
fare compared to a situation where carbon emission rights cannot be traded on international 
competitive markets.  It also indicates - just as McKibbin et al. (1999) predict – that permit 
trade on international markets will cause large distributional effects.  And it shows that allow-
ing for international trade in carbon emission rights is a win-win situation:  As Figures 5.4 and 
5.5 indicate, compared to NOF scenarios, FLEX scenarios either reduce welfare losses or in-
crease welfare relative to OPTIMA.   
Contrary to that banking and borrowing is a win-loose option.  Regions with a high initial 
endowment of carbon emission rights are suffering from introducing when flexibility, whereas 
regions which are poorly equipped only can gain from intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse 
gas abatement.  This is not too big a surprise.  Economists' conventional wisdom tells that 
welfare can decrease with when to abate flexibility.  First, an international agency that seeks 
to promote Pareto-efficiency by issuing permits based on flows of emissions looses control 
over the dating of emissions, if banking and borrowing is allowed.  Second, Leiby and Rubin 
(2001) have shown that banking can lead to welfare losses unless carbon emission rights are 
traded at the correct intertemporal exchange rate.  The latter is determined by the ratio of cur-
rent marginal stock damages to discounted future value of marginal stock damages less the 
decay rate of emissions.  
5.4  Per-capita consumption 
Present values bear no information about the intertemporal distribution of welfare.  However, 
since regional welfare is directly related to the logarithm of consumption (see (3.9)), per-
capita consumption might be used as rough indicator for the distribution of welfare over time. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Utility South












Index relative to OPTIMA









































































In Figures 5.6 and 5.7 OPTIMA is taken as reference.  Per-capita consumption of all other 
scenarios is represented as deviation from OPTIMA values.  The reasoning is that compared 
to other scenarios, OPTIMA exhibits the lowest intertemporal variation in per-capita con-
sumption.  From a Rawlsian perspective, OPTIMA might be regarded as inter-generational 
fair, since it is closest to constant per capita consumption. 
Dashed  lines  represent  how  per-capita  consumption  would  evolve  over  time,  if  emission 
shares attributed according to the CAP rule.  Solid lines represent deviations in per-capita 
consumption from OPTIMA if the grand-fathering (GRAND) rule applies.  This leads to sug-
gestive results as Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show.  Whether or not per-capita consumption streams 
are  above  OPTIMA  values  solely  depends  upon  the  initial  allocation  of  carbon  emission 
shares – with quite opposite effects in both regions.  
But the degree of flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement also matters.  To identify how dif-
ferent flexibility requiems affect welfare, let us first consider the GRAND distribution of car-
bon rights.  In the North GRAND-FLEX clearly is the winning scenario (see Figure 5.6).  The 
other scenarios exhibit both winner and looser generations.  In the middle of the 21
th century 
GRAND-BABO as well as  GRAND-NOF make people worse compared to OPTIMA.  Now, 
since  intertemporal  distribution  effects  are  more  pronounced  in  GRAND-NOF  than  in 
GRAND-BABO, GRAND-BABO seems favorable from the perspective of intergenerational 
fairness, although GRAND-NOF is superior from an overall utility.  
In South (see Figure 5.7), GRAND-NOF is the loosing scenario.  Compared to OPTIMA it 
imposes lower consumption levels for a whole century - and a trough on consumption in the 
middle  of  our  century.    Increasing  flexibility  improves  per-capita  consumption,  although 
OPTIMA values are never reached.  
Now let us assume that emission shares are allocated according to CAP rule.  As can be seen 
from Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the impact of different flexibility regimes is less pronounced than it 
was in the GRAND distribution of shares, and the direction of the effects are just reversed.  If 
emission shares are allocated according to CAP, then in North OPTIMA is characterized by 
the highest per-capita consumption.  No other scenario can create higher per-capita consump-
tion streams.  The lowest deviations from OPTIMA are obtained for CAP-BABO, which 
comes close to OPTIMA.  In the South introducing flexibility stipulates per-capita consump-
tion.  Now CAP-FLEX allows the highest consumption, whereas CAP-BABO lies between 
OPTIMA and CAP-FLEX values.  
 
6.  Sensitivity Analysis 
So far numerical parameters have been benchmarked against data that were taken over from 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Manne et al. (1995) as well as Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger 
(1998) (for details, see Appendix).  This allows relating our results of Section 5 to the litera-
ture.  It should be kept in mind, however, that numerical inputs into long-term models are 
more or less educated guesses.  This motivates for sensitivity analyses with respect to the 
most important parameters. 
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  Highest Carbon Levels  Lowest Carbon Level    
Parameter  Peak Level  Scenario  Peak Level  Scenario  Spread (%) 
Base Wr   705  OPTIMA  651  GRAND-NOF  4 
Wr + 25   650   CAP-BABO   612  GRAND-NOF  3 
Wr – 25   784  CAP-BABO   715  GRAND-NOF  4.6 
Wr = WS  665  OPTIMA  641  GRAND-NOF  1.8 
Wr = WN  796  OPTIMA  786  GRAND-NOF  0.6 
 
Table 6.1: Sensitivity of atmospheric carbon with respect to Wr. 
 
Welfare effects are almost invariant when key parameters such as regional climate damages, 
discount factors or potential GDP growth rates are altered.  But projections of climate change 
impacts  respond  to  parameter  changes.    Now,  any  integrated  assessment  model  relates 
changes in atmospheric carbon stocks to economic losses.  Obviously, Wr  is the key parame-
ter in such a relationship (see (3.2)).  It expresses a region’s perception at which CO2 concen-
tration its entire conventional wealth would be worthless (see Section 3.1). In Section 5 for 
numerical calculations WN and Wr have been set equal to 1624 ppm and 1254 ppm, respec-
tively.  That means, South fears catastrophic climate damages, if the 1990 atmospheric CO2 
concentration is raised by factor 3.5.  In the North the catastrophic level is expected to be 4.5 
times higher than the actual one.  
Table 6.1 reports how different numerical assumptions about the regional catastrophe levels 
affect the peak of atmospheric carbon concentration.  To get an impression about the order of 
magnitude, the column Spread represents the percentage deviation of peak-levels from the 
mean taken over all scenarios.  Four alternative specifications are contrasted with the numeri-
cal assumption used in Section 5:  Two of them assume that North and South still have different 
perceptions, but at different levels:  Wr + 25 means Wr is uniformly increased by 25 %, Wr - 25 
represents a 25 % decrease of perceptions in each region.  Identical catastrophe levels are sup-
posed in the last two cases.  Regional perceptions of a climate catastrophe are either that of the 
South (WS) or the North (WN), respectively.  
OPTIMA is worst in terms of atmospheric carbon.  However, this result is sensitive with re-
spect to Wr.  A uniform increase or decrease of Wr changes the ranking of scenarios with re-
spect to peak atmospheric carbon.  In case of a decrease in Wr, CAP-BABO induces highest 
climate damages.  GRAND-NOF exhibits lowest atmospheric concentrations independent of 
the choices of the parameter.  This actually supports environmentalists’ hypothesis that adding 
flexibility increases climate damages.  Note however that the spread between highest and 
lowest peak levels do not vary much (see Table 6.1).  
Potential GDP growth is a further critical numerical input.  If labor inputs are measured in 
efficiency units, then potential GDP growth is closely related to population growth:  It repre-  17
sents the potential growth of a regional economy as function of population growth only.  Now 
Section 5 employs different potential GDP growth rates for North and South (see Appendix).  
In the North potential GDP growth is assumed being 1.5 % uniformly, while potential growth 
in the South starts at a rate of 3.5 % in 2000 and drops down to 1.5 % by 2200.  Alternatively 
one might set potential GDP growth to 3% in the South over the whole time horizon.  That is 
– due to the long time horizon – a quite significant deviation from the original numerical as-
sumption.  It leads to a slight reduction of Pareto-efficient carbon concentration, but only by 
meager 0.7 per cent.  And – more important - the ranking of scenarios with respect to peak 
carbon  levels  changes.    When  flexibility  now  exhibits  slightly  higher  peak  levels  than 
OPTIMA, whereas lowest levels are again observed for GRAND-NOF. 
Finally, let us focus on a key technology parameter - inertia within the energy supply system 
to phase out fossil fuels.  To provide greater flexibility in adopting non-fossil fuels, maximal 
feasible rate of annual phase out is increased by 25 per cent.  Increasing the speed of potential 
de-carbonization reduces the Pareto-efficient peak-level of carbon concentration by 4 %.  A 
slightly lower reduction is observed in CAP-NOF.  No effects are obtained for CAP-BABO, 
while peak levels are increased for the remaining scenarios. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Among economists there is almost general agreement that where flexibility in greenhouse gas 
abatement should be an integral part of an international treaty on climate policy.  Our analysis 
supports such a viewpoint.  International trade of carbon emission rights ensures efficiency in 
greenhouse gas abatement irrespectively to the initial allocation of carbon rights.  And since 
the Pareto-efficient stock of atmospheric carbon is independent of the initial distribution of 
carbon emission shares, it is feasible to separate the issues of efficiency from that of equity. 
However, where flexibility is not the main focus of this paper.  Instead, banking and borrow-
ing of carbon emission rights is considered as an alternative for creating flexibility in green-
house gas abatement.  Now, does when flexibility work in a similar direction as international 
trade of carbon rights on competitive markets does?  In principle the answer is yes, but needs 
some qualifications. 
In contrast to where flexibility when to abate flexibility does not guarantee that the optimal 
carbon accumulation is independent of the initial allocation of carbon rights.  Different initial 
sharing  rules  clearly  influence  the  development  of  atmospheric  carbon  concentration.  
Coasian separability between the initial allocation of emission shares and the optimal concen-
tration of atmospheric carbon as mentioned does not apply, although when flexibility moves 
the development of atmospheric carbon towards the Pareto-efficient concentration - however, 
without full convergence.  
Where flexibility represents a win-win situation.  All regions can improve welfare through 
trading carbon emission rights.  When flexibility creates a win-loose option.  Regions that 
have a high initial endowment in carbon rights suffer from intertemporal flexibility, while 
regions with a small carbon budget can gain from it.  Therefore, when flexibility is likely to 
counteract unequal initial distributions of carbon shares.  This is consistent with our observa-
tion that when flexibility seems to support fairness between generations and across regions.   18
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Basic Economic Data 
 
Data  North  South 
GDP 1990 (US$ trillions)  16.3  4.5 
Capital-GDP ratio  2.5  3.0 
Energy consumption (Exajoules)  176  168 
Elasticity of substitution energy-value added  0.2  0.35 
Carbon emissions (GtC)  2.9  3.0 
Economic damage due to double pre-industrial CO2 (%)  1.5  3.5 
Utility discount rate  0.03  0.03 
     
 
Table 2 
Potential GDP growth rates 
 
  North  South 
1990 - 2120  1.5  3.5 
2130  1.5  3.25 
 2140  1.5  3 
2150  1.5  2.75 
2160  1.5  2.5 
2170  1.5  2.25 
2180  1.5  2 
2190  1.5  1.75 
2200  1.5  1.5 
 